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Synthesis
Matching Social and Ecological Systems in Complex Ocean
Fisheries
James A. Wilson1
ABSTRACT. This paper considers ocean fisheries as complex adaptive systems and addresses the question
of how human institutions might be best matched to their structure and function. Ocean ecosystems operate
at multiple scales, but the management of fisheries tends to be aimed at a single species considered at a
single broad scale. The paper argues that this mismatch of ecological and management scale makes it
difficult to address the fine-scale aspects of ocean ecosystems, and leads to fishing rights and strategies
that tend to erode the underlying structure of populations and the system itself. A successful transition to
ecosystem-based management will require institutions better able to economize on the acquisition of
feedback about the impact of human activities. This is likely to be achieved by multiscale institutions whose
organization mirrors the spatial organization of the ecosystem and whose communications occur through
a polycentric network. Better feedback will allow the exploration of fine-scale science and the employment
of fine-scale fishing restraints, better adapted to the behavior of fish and habitat. The scale and scope of
individual fishing rights also needs to be congruent with the spatial structure of the ecosystem. Place-based
rights can be expected to create a longer private planning horizon as well as stronger incentives for the
private and public acquisition of system relevant knowledge.
Key Words: resource governance; fisheries; complex adaptive systems; scale; fishing effort;
decentralization; governance institutions; incentives; multiscale governance; fishing rights; ecosystem
management; ecosystem-based management; polycentric networks
INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been a parade of scientific
articles about how we have overfished the ocean
and how, in the process, we have dismantled the
structure and functioning of its ecosystems (Pauly
et al. 1998, Jackson et al. 2001, Myers and Worm
2003, Frank et al. 2005). This result from fishing
appears to be of much longer duration and more
serious than had previously been imagined. It
clearly points to the need for different ways to
manage human activity in the oceans. If there is a
consensus forming around this problem, it is
reflected in the increasingly strong calls for a shift
to ecosystem-based management (e.g., NRC 1999a,
b, Pew 2003, USCOP 2004, McLeod et al. 2005)
and in a growing understanding of the importance
of social-ecological linkages (see also, Costanza et
al. 1998, Folke et al. 1998, Hughes et al. 2005). How
to go about building an understanding of these
social-ecological linkages, and then incorporating
them into the practical management of ocean
ecosystems, is not a matter of consensus.
The strongest analytical traditional that attempts to
incorporate human and natural interactions can be
found in the single species bioeconomic models that
constitute the conceptual basis for most
management. This approach is explicit about
economic and biological connections, and has been
the driver of many of the most obvious management
innovations of the last several decades. It is a
reasonable attempt to understand human influence
on ocean systems, but one has to wonder whether it
has disguised the complexity of the ocean in a way
that is adaptively dysfunctional. This paper, or essay
if one prefers, is driven by a deep skepticism about
the fundamental idea that animates conventional
bioeconomics, i.e., the presumed ability to control
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biological outcomes at the level of particular
populations or stocks. Consequently, this paper
explores an alternative perspective, one that
conceives of the ocean as a complex adaptive
ecosystem. I believe that this kind of exploration is
important because, if one begins to look at the ocean
in this way, the appropriate restraints on fishing and
the institutions that we need for sustainable
management appear to be very different from those
that appear logical and practical if one holds the
conventional bioeconomic view.
For this reason, even though I am a social scientist,
the paper begins with a sketch of a mental model of
the ocean as a complex biophysical system. The
purpose of this sketch is to describe the broad
structure and dynamics of this kind of system. The
model is used as an alternative to the typical single
species, stock-recruitment heuristic. It outlines a
way to conceive of orderliness in the natural world
without relying upon the concepts of stochastic
clockwork mechanisms.
The paper then turns to an analysis of the kinds of
fishing strategies that are encouraged when
conventional management is applied in a complex
environment, the nature of the overfishing problem
that results, and why that result is likely to produce,
over the long-term, an unintended erosion of
ecosystem structure and function. The final section
of the paper addresses the question of how we go
about designing institutions that will facilitate a
sustainable adaptation to ocean ecosystems. The
paper frames this question in terms of a problem in
the organization of management institutions and the
design of individual access rights. The overall point
of the paper is that if we hope to make a transition
to ecosystem-based management, we will have to
begin with reformed institutional arrangements,
carefully designed to acquire better feedback about
the effect of our actions in the system. Presumably,
the scientific and practical knowledge that we gain
from the feedback will facilitate our ability to learn
and to adapt to the complexity of the ocean.
A MENTAL MODEL OF A COMPLEX
FISHERY
Let me describe, first, the mental model that I think
is relevant to, at least, the fisheries of New England
and Atlantic Canada, although the knowledge I have
of other systems leads me to believe that the broad
structure and dynamics of this system are not
unique. In the northwest Atlantic, in recent years, a
variety of both empirical and historical studies have
pointed to the importance of populations'
adaptations to a spatially and temporally complex
environment and, especially, the extent to which
fishing has impaired those adaptations. Ames (1997,
2004) conducted interviews with retired fishermen,
for example, that indicate numerous, now
extinguished, local populations of cod, haddock,
and pollock along the coast of Maine. A variety of
other studies draw a similar picture of a
heterogeneous and stressed environment, inhabited
by locally adapted populations (Frank et al. 1994,
Perkins et al. 1997, Sinclair et al. 1997, Taggart et
al. 1998, Smedbol and Stephenson 2001,
Wroblewski 2001, Green and Wroblewski 2001).
The collapse of the great Canadian cod fisheries
(Hutchings and Myers 1995), the dramatic changes
in species structure in New England (Fogarty and
Murawski 1998), and the loss of large predators
throughout the region contributes to a picture of a
system whose structure has been seriously eroded
(Steneck 1997, Jackson et al. 2001, Pauly and
Maclean 2003).
The conventional bioeconomic approach to
fisheries attempts to simplify this complexity by
partitioning the system into multiple, independent,
single species components whose long-term
dynamics are specified by some version of a stock/
recruitment relationship. The intention is to arrive
at a practical understanding of the long-term
dynamics of each stock so that we might change our
behavior in a way that is consistent with the
sustainability of the stock. There is an important and
usually unstated assumption that if this is done for
all stocks, the broader ecosystem also will be
sustained.
However, as John Holland (1998) puts it, there is a
hidden order in complex systems that suggests a
different way of simplifying. This order is not
envisioned as that of a clockwork mechanism with
clear and stable causal relationships. Rather, it is
conceptualized as a much looser and less predictable
order that arises from the constraints generated by
the evolved behavior of the biological and human
elements of the system. Applied to the marine
environment, this perspective begins with the
presumption that the species in this, or any, natural
environment has coevolved at a relatively broad
temporal and spatial scale, and it has coadapted
locally and relatively quickly, compared to
evolutionary processes, to take advantage of the
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feeding and shelter opportunities and/or to avoid the
predation threats of a complex, nonlinear world
(Conover 2000, Walters 2000). For example, an
opportunity for improved survival and reproduction
for herring today because of, say, a fortuitous
change in water temperature, becomes an
opportunity for improved survival and reproduction
for cod or another herring predator tomorrow. These
kinds of ecological responses of one species to
another, and to changes in the abiotic environment,
constrain the abundance of the various populations
and, as a result, generate both order and diversity in
the system (Levin 1999). It is this system of
population regulation, i.e., ecosystem function and
structure, that we appear to have eroded through
fishing, pollution, and a variety of other
interventions.
In this kind of system, regulation of populations is
“loose” in the sense that the resulting dynamics are
not easily characterized as strongly equilibrating
(Hixon et al. 2002). Population responses are often
characterized by long delays, exponential growth,
and frequent overshoot. It takes a while for the size
of one population, say a predator species, to respond
to changes in a prey population. As innumerable
predator-prey models show, it is extremely difficult,
even for two-species models to achieve equilibrium.
Chaos and other complicated dynamics are typical;
increasing the dimensions of these models simply
compounds that apparent disorder (Flake 1998).
Complicating the dynamics even more is the
overlapping functional role of various species
(Steneck 2001); in the language of economics, many
species tend to be good substitutes for one another.
For this reason, it is difficult to know which species
might respond to, say, an explosion of the
population of a prey species. The survival of the fish
larvae of a predator population, at a particular point
in its life history, may depend upon how many, if
any, larvae are delivered by currents to, or are
retained locally in, a place where at the right time,
the right size, and the amount and kind of food has
drifted from elsewhere, or has been produced
locally. Even though there is a great abundance of
prey, the contingencies of this kind of complex,
nonlinear environment may result in an explosive,
or little or no, response from a particular predator
population, or a response that is delayed until early
life history conditions are just right. Else, it may
mean that another predator is the principal
respondent or that the prey species is able to become
the predator of the early life history of its erstwhile
predator.
The practical question posed by this kind of
population regulation is not whether there are forces
in the system that constrain the abundance of
populations, there obviously are; rather, it is
whether those constraints operate with enough
force, and in a timely enough fashion, for us to
predict the outcome of our interventions in their
dynamics. The experience of fisheries population
work indicates only a limited capacity to predict our
effect upon the near-term size of already recruited
population cohorts, e.g., using yield per recruit
models, and a near absence of an ability to predict
our impact on recruitment (Beverton 1998). In other
words, at the population level, what we can measure
and control is not necessarily related to
sustainability. If we were not in this situation, the
calls for ecosystem-based approaches to management
would be much less compelling.
Generally, it seems that the conditions in the
biophysical system, as opposed to the conditions in
the population, tend to dominate recruitment and
long-term population outcomes. In a relatively
intact system with a fair number of functionally
similar species, the range of variations in individual
populations, especially those due to changes in
recruitment, might be expected to be relatively rapid
and irregular, whereas variation at the system level
might be expected to be slower and more stable
(O’Neill et al. 1986). In systems that have lost
various components, or are naturally depauperate,
compensating dynamics might be expected to be
even looser and likely to lead to highly variable,
episodic, and unpredictable changes in the
abundance of individual populations (Levin 1999,
Holling and Gunderson 2002).
Compounding the difficulty of these dynamics even
more, especially from the social/management
perspective, is the tendency of these systems to shift
to alternative states in which the factors regulating
the abundance of individual populations change.
These system shifts occur at almost any scale in the
system. Relatively fine-scale flips can accumulate
to broad systemic effects, and equally, broadscale
changes in the biophysical environment due to
climate or oceanographic changes or fishing out the
top of the food chain (Myers and Worm 2003) can
impose dramatic changes throughout the fine-scale
components of the system (Steneck 1997, Scheffer
et al. 2001, Rietkerk et al. 2004). It would appear
that these shifts are more likely to occur in systems
with loose regulation, i.e., less response diversity
(Elmqvist et al. 2003) and, therefore, less resilience
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to human and naturally occurring change. A
particularly worrisome aspect of these kinds of
shifts, especially those that occur in response to
fishing, is their tendency to drive systems toward
degraded states in which a large part of the
biological activity becomes concentrated low in the
food web (Pauly et al. 1998). As individual elements
of the system are lost, system constraints become
even looser, and the structure becomes more
vulnerable to both internal and external
perturbations (Low et al. 2002).
Furthermore, our ability to observe and understand
these changes in system structure may be disguised
by compensatory shifts among its various
populations (Cooper and Mangel 1999, Jackson et
al. 2001). That is, the loss of some population
components may enhance the growth and
abundance of the remaining components and,
especially if we observe the system only at a broad
scale, we might notice little or no change in spite of
significant differences in the underlying spatial
structure of the population and system.
Nevertheless, the effect on the system is to loosen
population regulation still more, increase variability
and, thus, the likelihood that populations might be
pushed beyond minimum thresholds, or explode
into periods of hyperabundance.
Finding a practical way to simplify this complexity
means finding ways to monitor and interact with the
system so that we get as much feedback about its
behavior and our effect upon that behavior as
possible. In that regard, the system’s physical, i.e.,
non-living oceanographic attributes, e.g., its
topography, currents, chemical make up, and
pattern of seasonal change are the most regular
elements of the system. These elements are
configured in ways that are strongly place based,
multiscale, and diverse. Recognizable patterns
occur at, say, the scale of the North Atlantic as well
as at the scale of a small embayment. One could
partition the North Atlantic, or any other large
system, into a nested hierarchy of spatially defined,
somewhat independent components ranging in size
from small estuaries to the North Atlantic as a
whole, with each component displaying regularities
that strongly reflect its unique oceanographic
circumstances (Apollonio 2002).
These regularities, or patterns, allow feedback that
makes learning and adaptation possible. The
behavior of fish and other organisms, including
fishermen, strongly reflects these place-specific
abiotic regularities, and their interactions lead to the
formation of a spatially structured metacommunity
(Guichard et al 2004, Kritzer and Sale 2004). Over
any short period, one might observe a hierarchy of
communities structured along the lines of the
physical system. However, these are open
communities in the sense that organisms are not
confined, generally, to particular places. Depending
upon the particulars of their adaptations, they may
move quickly or slowly from one part of the ocean
to another, e.g., tunas vs. tunicates. Population
components whose genetic make up might be
indistinguishable may spawn at separate sites, may
be relatively sedentary at a particular location, or
may migrate and mix with other components of the
larger population. All sorts of complex spatial
patterns as well as an equally large number of
complex interactions with other species might occur
over, say, an annual cycle (e.g., Cowen et al. 2000,
Hixon et al. 2002, Robichaud and Rose 2004).
The mobility of an organism causes one’s
perception of the spatial dimension of ecological
connectedness to change according to the temporal
scale one adopts. Over a short period, say a matter
of days, most organisms are more or less stationary
and any small place might be viewed as relatively
independent from others; within each locality there
is a relatively direct connectedness among
organisms. With distance and time, the strength of
that connectedness dissipates quickly. Over a period
of a season or a year, the mobility of organisms
increases and the spatial extent of connectedness
enlarges. Over a decade, there is still broader
connectedness, but it is less tightly linked and more
difficult to observe (O’Neill et al. 1986).
Consequently, when one observes the system for
periods of short duration, small and generally
quickly changing subsystems are the scale at which
one might most easily observe coherence, capture
feedback, and stand the greatest chance to learn
about the system; this is an important attribute that
Levin (1999) refers to as “tight local feedback.” For
longer periods, coherence and feedback appear in
larger, slowly changing subsystems, but the ability
to capture feedback is hampered by an increasingly
large number of intervening events. Thus, what is
an open, closed, or leaky system, and what and how
well one can observe and understand depends upon
the temporal scale that one adopts. For these
reasons, explicit recognition of the multiple spatial/
temporal scales of the system is essential if we hope
to capture meaningful feedback that allows us to
learn and adapt.
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One of the most significant aspects of this
perspective, when compared with the conventional
mental model, is the sense that order in the system
is the result of relatively loose regulatory processes
that do not create strong equilibrium tendencies
among the populations in the system. This attribute
makes human interventions in the system difficult
to understand and their outcomes difficult to predict
and control. Importantly, it also tends to strongly
bias our forecasting ability toward relatively naive
extrapolations from current states. Generally, that
bias seems related to the mass of the organism,
population, or system of interest; the larger the mass,
the easier to monitor, and the more likely will be
it’s continuance in its current state, or rate of change
of state, over a given period of time (O’Neill et al.
1986). For example, it is extremely difficult to
successfully forecast the abundance of cohorts of
larval and juvenile fish, whereas it is much easier
to forecast changes in the abundance of already
recruited cohorts of mature fish. This bias has
important implications for the way in which we
organize our observation of the system, for our sense
of the kinds of biological outcomes we can control
or influence, and especially for our understanding
of the regulatory response of fishermen to different
kinds of rights.
CONVENTIONAL MANAGEMENT IN A
COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT
These ideas about the complexity of ecosystem
structure and function are more or less in the
mainstream of ecological science, but it has been
difficult to incorporate them into applied fisheries
science and management (Hutchings 2000,
Degnbol 2001, Hughes et al. 2005). As a practical
matter, in spite of our knowledge about the
complexity of these systems, if not the details of that
complexity, we act as if the long-term dynamics of
individual populations are regulated mostly by their
own numbers. I think it is fair to say that we do this
because, given our limited ability to monitor the
resource and forecast the results of our actions, it
appears to be a useful and practical way to act.
However, if one views the oceans as having complex
spatial and temporal dynamics such as outlined in
the mental model above, and certainly if one
considers the current state of the marine
environment, it is reasonable to be skeptical about
the viability of this approach. One might identify
three aspects of conventional management that,
together, are the source of this skepticism. The first
concerns the effectiveness of management based on
the idea that we are able to affect the sustainability
of a stock through controls on fishing mortality. This
idea is the foundation of almost all thinking about
the design of management institutions and,
especially, of access rights appropriate for long-
term sustainability. However, it is not an approach
that managers have found easy to implement,
because the long chain of nonlinear events between
spawning and eventual recruitment makes
prediction extremely difficult. Consequently,
management usually directs its attention to the yield
of larger, already recruited fish, because doing so is
consistent with our limited abilities to forecast
changes in short-term abundance, not because it is
necessarily related to long-term sustainability
(Beverton 1998).
Second, the mental model described above and the
evidence of the complex spatial behavior of fish
stocks are reason to be skeptical of the ability, using
conventional management approaches, to match or
assign fishing effort to individual stocks and,
therefore, to know what stocks are actually being
fished. In other words, even if we were able to
forecast the effect of fishing effort on recruitment,
the inability to know the stocks that are being fished
calls in to question the practical, regulatory result
of proceeding as if we could do this. The third area
of skepticism concerns the ability to treat the system
as if it were decomposable into independent species-
specific units. This presumed ability carries with it
strong and naively optimistic assumptions about the
ways in which human interventions accumulate in
the system as a whole. There seems to be little reason
to expect species-specific, short-term “optimal”
harvesting strategies to add up to a system result
that is desirable. These three problems, i.e.,
recruitment, spatial complexity, and the cumulative
effects of our actions are hard to separate. In the
section that follows I emphasize problems of spatial
complexity, because they tend to bring together all
three concerns.
Problems of spatial complexity
It is generally accepted that building robust and
effective institutions for the management of
resources requires a close match between the spatial
extent of the resource and the institutions used to
manage the use of that resource (Ostrom 1990, Folke
et al. 1998, Young 2002). Mismatches tend to create
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serious impediments to conservation that are
especially obvious when the range of the fish is
broad enough that they cross national political
boundaries. However, much less attention is paid to
the kinds of mismatches that disguise fine-scale and
more complex adaptations of fish populations.
Suppose, for example, that managers are dealing
with a population of a single species that ranges over
a large area. Assume that managers proceed as if
that species might be separated from the rest of the
ecosystem and as if its abundance could be sustained
principally through the appropriate choice of a
harvest rate that maximized the yield of fish already,
or about to be, recruited to the population. To
complicate the usual biological assumptions just
slightly, suppose that this is a metapopulation whose
components are spatially separated stocks that have
adapted through behavioral or genetic means to
local circumstances.
If managers were not aware of these spatially
separate components, or if they were and, because
of administrative costs or other constraints,
proceeded as if they were dealing with a single,
homogeneous group, assessments and other
estimates of the status of this metapopulation would
reflect an average of its components. Such a number
might be a reasonable estimate of the total numbers
in the metapopulation, and they might lead to a
reasonable estimate of the rate of fishing mortality
necessary to maximize average yield per recruit
over the entire metapopulation (Cooper and Mangel
1999). However, those measurements would
effectively disguise the fine-scale structure and
long-term dynamics of the populations’ local
components. Most importantly, any estimate of
allowable fishing mortality for the metapopulation
as a whole would ignore the fact that rational
fishermen would selectively concentrate their effort
on those localized population components that were
most abundant at any one time (Wilson 2002,
Wilson et al. 2000). In other words, unlike
managers, fishermen would pay close attention to
the heterogeneous spatial aspects of the
metapopulation and would not fish “on the
average.” As each local population bloomed, the
preponderance of fishing effort would shift to take
advantage of the catch-rate efficiencies that each
bloom produced.
Under these circumstances, the potential level of
fishing mortality that could be applied to each
component would be the amount managers had
calculated for the entire metapopulation and, in
every instance, the potential level of effort would
be in excess of what was appropriate for any of the
local components of the population. The result for
each component would be de facto open access,
even with strict, i.e., precautionary, metapopulation-
level controls on fishing mortality. Each fisherman
would strive to find the most abundant, or profitable,
local component, to fish it as efficiently as possible
and then, as the catch rate fell, and taking into
account the probable costs of search, leave to find
the next most, now first most, abundant, or
profitable local component. For fishermen,
successful competition in this kind of regulatory
regime requires adaptations that usually emphasize
large, mobile technology that is able to efficiently
locate and harvest fish aggregations over the broad
range of management, which is not the range of the
stocks. Mancur Olson (2000) compares these kinds
of incentives to those of a "roving bandit." Olson’s
phrase is colorful but in this situation the behavior
is fully legal and fostered by the scale of the fishing
rules created by managers. For the fisherman in this
situation, competitive pressures mean they must
always think of the next place to fish; any thoughts
of stewardship that they might harbor about the
current location of fishing is clearly inconsistent
with self-interest, simply because the individual
benefits from voluntary restraint at a fine scale
cannot be captured in a broadscale management
regime.
Of course, if managers realized they were faced with
a spatially simple metapopulation like this, they
might be in a position to draw appropriate
boundaries that would allow them to match fishing
mortality with the growth capabilities of each
component. Then, the problem of loss of population
components might be more easily addressed.
However, it would seem more likely that a
metapopulation of fish in any kind of complex
system would not separate itself into spatially
distinct components throughout its life cycle.
Consider, therefore, a slightly more complicated
biology in which a metapopulation is characterized
by components that are segregated at certain times
of the year and/or during particular life stages and
mixed at others, e.g., separated when spawning and
mixed on the feeding grounds. Salmon would seem
to be the archetypical example of this kind of
population structure.
With this kind of spatial-temporal pattern, even if
managers knew about or suspected a metapopulation
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structure, there would be little that they could do to
match effort to each component unless the fishery
took place at a time in the life cycle of the fish during
which the components were separated. For example,
the Canadian fishery for roe herring (Clupea
harengus) in the Bay of Fundy takes place on the
spawning grounds and appears to conform to these
circumstances (Stephenson 1998). However, when
a fishery takes place at times when the components
of the population mix, the outcome would depend
upon the fine-scale interactions of fish and
fishermen. If the components of the metapopulation
were randomly mixed in space, an economically
efficient search would lead to effort applied in
proportion to the abundance of each component. If
the fish were segregated into aggregations or
schools associated with each population component,
fishing effort might be directed more than
proportionately onto the denser aggregations and,
depending on the fine-scale interactions of fish and
fishermen, could threaten the long-term integrity of
those components. Other more complicated and
changing patterns of mixing and separation might
be possible and plausible from an ecological
perspective. Furthermore, patterns of mixing might
be expected to change from year to year or season
to season as the abundance of the various population
components, the behavior of the fish, and the other
biophysical attributes of the system change. Each
pattern of mixing is likely to lead to unique and,
given broadscale assessments of the population,
undetectable impacts on the structure of the
metapopulation (Cooper and Mangel 1999).
This kind of spatially complex behavior might
appear to make broadscale management fatally
flawed, but this is not necessarily correct. In this,
and in the spatially simple case, fishermens’
tendencies to switch among fish stocks and fish
populations’ and tendencies for compensating
growth would effectively mitigate management’s
impairment (Wilson and Townsend 1986). One
might view the result as stumbling from one to
another episode of local component overfishing,
while always being forgiven by a resilient system.
However, if fishing tended to push population
components across a threshold beyond which
successful reproduction was threatened, even if only
occasionally, and if the effect of crossing that
threshold was relatively long-term as seems to be
the case (Jackson et al. 2001, Ames 2004, Frank et
al. 2005), then one would expect broadscale
management to lead, over the long term, to the
erosion of the spatial structure of the population, in
spite of restrictive controls on fishing mortality at
the level of the metapopulation.
The great difficulty this poses for management is
that the factors that determine population thresholds
are not easy to understand and are likely to be the
result of fine-scale events that are hard to monitor.
At any time, the minimum viable size for a
population component is undoubtedly the result of
many factors. An unusual combination of otherwise
common events might make a population unusually
sensitive, or unusually resilient, to fishing. For
example, a storm followed by a sudden drop in
temperature, accompanied by the inward migration
of a large population of predators might push a local
prey population into a restricted area and create
great fishing conditions in which fishermen’s catch
rate stayed high until the population was pushed
below a size necessary for successful reproduction.
Furthermore, as the number of evolved elements in
the biological system declines over time due to
fishing, the compensating responses that both
restrain and enhance populations are weakened.
This increases population variability and the
likelihood that any individual component in the
system might explode into hyperabundance or be
pushed beyond its minimum viable level and lost.
Modern fishing techniques compound the problem.
Efficient search and catching technologies allow
boats to continue fishing small patches when they
might otherwise tend to leave to search for ones with
greater density. With each local loss the constraints
that create order in the system loosen still further,
resilience declines even more, and the likelihood of
further loss of constraining structure increases,
leading to a cascade toward a different and usually
degraded alternative system state (Pauly et al. 1998,
Rietkerk et al. 2004). This kind of outcome is
qualitatively different and a much more serious
form of overfishing than that contemplated by the
conventional perspective.
Some fine-scale examples
The long-term effect of fishing on ecological
structure and function is the accumulated result of
a large, or sometimes small, number of discrete,
fine-scale events. Three examples from Maine will
suffice to describe these effects, but almost any
fishery in the world would probably yield a similar
history. First, until the advent of trawlers, cod
(Gadus morhua), the dominant predator in the
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system, were taken mostly with hook and line.
Because cod do not tend to feed when they are part
of a spawning aggregation, the use of hook and line
technology creates a virtual sanctuary for the fish
during their spawning period. Unfortunately for the
cod, they tend to gather into dense schools in
preparation for and during spawning. For a trawler,
this behavior creates the ultimate target. Interviews
with retired fishermen who brought this technology
to the coast of Maine during the 1930s and 1940s,
speak of huge hauls of ripe and running cod from a
number of localized, relatively small spawning
areas (Ames 1997, 2004). Many of these apparently
discrete spawning components were extirpated in
the first 20-30 yr of trawling, and have not been
reestablished in the 60-70 yr since.
A similar experience appears to have occurred with
the herring fishery. Until the 1970s along the Maine
coast herring (Clupea harengus) were caught almost
exclusively with passive gear, e.g., weirs and stop-
seines. The location of this gear was strictly limited
by the occurrence of favorable shore, bottom
configurations, and the behavior of the fish.
Searching out the fish was not possible. Conducted
in this way, the fishery persisted at a relatively high
harvest level for over 100 yr. With the advent of
electronic fish finders, large purse seines, and mid-
water trawls, fishermen acquired a greatly enhanced
ability to chase down and extinguish individual
schools. Coincidentally, the presence of fish in
coastal waters has gone into a sharp decline. The
inshore, passive gear fishery disappeared in the
early 1980s, except for a few operations in the far-
eastern part of the state (Graham 1982, Neal 2001).
At the same time, National Marine Fisheries Service
assessments of herring populations in the entire Gulf
of Maine and on Georges Bank indicate a relatively
abundant metapopulation. Nevertheless, even
though the abundance of the metapopulation may
not have declined, there has been a significant shift
in the spatial distribution of the components of that
population. This could be passed off as simply a
change in the habits of the fish, or it could signal a
substantial loss of many components of the
population, accompanied by compensating growth
of those that remain. It is, of course, arguable
whether this new technology was responsible for
the loss of the inshore components of the population.
Nevertheless, the timing of its introduction and its
scale are entirely consistent with that possibility.
The green sea urchin (Strongylocentrotus
droebachiensis) fishery in Maine provides another
sobering example of our inability to match the
characteristics of fishing effort with the behavior of
natural populations. This fishery is an inshore
fishery pursued by divers and by small boats using
lightweight trawls. It was initiated in Maine about
1986, reached peak landings in the early 1990s, and
by 2000 had virtually disappeared. Reproduction is
by broadcast spawning and requires sufficient local
densities for success. Once the larvae settle, urchins
are sedentary. The population tends to aggregate in
patches associated with ledges, reefs, and other
physical features that provide favorable conditions
for feeding, survival, and spawning (Steneck et al.
2004). Fishermen, of course, are attracted to these
local patches. In the early years of the fishery, effort
concentrated on the more abundant and easily
accessible patches. As these patches were fished
down, fishing shifted to the less abundant and less
accessible patches. In the fished-down patches, kelp
began to grow and dominate. New populations of
micropredators then developed in the kelp and
prevented the further recruitment of urchins
(Varinec 2003), effectively protecting the kelp from
urchin herbivory and creating, thereby, a local
system shift. This process proceeded, generally,
from west to east along the coast. For all practical
purposes, the metapopulation of urchins was fished
out piece-by-piece, and these local system shifts
accumulated to the near complete loss of the fishery.
Viewed from a broad scale, one would have
observed a classic boom and bust cycle of
overfishing. Viewed from a finer scale, one would
have observed the successive “winking-out” of
hundreds of local patches, contributing to the loss
of the entire fishery (Jones 2005).
The common element in these three examples is that
the interaction of fish behavior and fishing gear at
a fine scale appears to have led to the extirpation of
local aggregations of these organisms. If those
aggregations were simply ephemeral patches of a
larger population, little long-term damage might
have been expected. However, those extirpations
appear to have had long-term ecological effects and,
consequently, it would be reasonable to conclude
that their accumulated impact has had a significant
detrimental effect, not only on the populations
directly, but on the system as a whole.
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Mismatches in a complex fishery
Our scientific conception of ocean systems is the
filter that determines our perception of the ways in
which human behavior affects those systems. The
mental model outlined above generates a
perspective that suggests two different forms of
overfishing. One is more or less consistent with the
conventional perspective. It occurs in the context of
a relatively resilient ecosystem in which blunt
controls on fishing mortality are not well-matched
to individual stocks. The mismatch is manifest in
the roving bandit incentives that encourage grab and
run, rather than stewardship behavior at any scale
below the scale of management. In spite of these
unintended effects and as long as each population
component remains reproductively viable, conventional
broadscale controls over mortality can be expected
to work, more or less, because the adaptive
responses of both the fishermen and the fish can be
expected to compensate for management’s inability
to match effort with population components.
The great danger of broadscale conventional
controls is that they tend to generate strong
incentives for efficient fishing strategies and
technologies that operate at a fine scale, i.e., finer
than the scale of management rules, and they tend
to increase the chances that the individual elements
of ecosystem structure will be occasionally
extirpated, i.e., population components, habitat, etc.
This is the second form of overfishing, what might
be termed ecological overfishing. The loss of
individual system components that marks
ecological overfishing tends to be long lasting,
erodes the underlying structure of the ecosystem,
and, as these losses accumulate, increases the
likelihood that the system, at whatever scale, might
flip to a generally degraded alternative state. This
perspective on overfishing strongly suggests the
need to move away from an emphasis on broadscale
controls on fishing outputs, i.e., fishing mortality,
and toward input restraints that are easier to adapt
to and more likely to protect the fine-scale
behavioral traits of individual fish and populations.
The overall objective has to be the maintenance of
ecosystem structure and process (Hutchings 2000,
Pitcher 2001). Part of the argument below is that a
change in management objectives coupled with a
change in governance will allow us to use input
controls to more effectively match human behavior
to ecosystems. In a slightly different light, this
perspective recasts the management problem from
one that attempts to predict, manipulate, and
optimize numerical targets for individual
populations into one that aims, instead, to maintain
the circumstances of a healthy system, i.e., does not
attempt to produce particular, especially stock level,
outcomes.
MANAGEMENT FEEDBACK IN A
COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT
This change in the objective of management, i.e.,
toward the maintenance of ecosystem structure,
implies a relatively substantial collective learning
problem (Friedmann 1987, Gunderson 1999, Folke
et al. 1998). This section of the paper does not
address that learning problem directly. What it asks
instead is a more limited question: how might we
design our management institutions and the fishing
rights of individuals so that, together, they generate
as much public feedback as possible about the effect
of our actions in these systems? Presumably, our
ability to learn and adapt is critically dependent
upon our ability to obtain feedback about the results
of our action. The argument is that the circumstances
determining that ability are principally a function
of how well we match the organization of our
management institutions and the terms of individual
access, to the spatial, temporal, and behavioral
dimensions of the environment, what Ostrom calls
congruence (1990). However, congruency is costly.
As we try to create a closer fit between the
organizational hierarchies of human and natural
systems, we create more boundaries, more
enforcement, and higher coordination costs. To the
extent that we can achieve a reasonable trade-off
between the benefits of better fit and the costs of
that fit, we relax the practical resource constraints
that limit the kind of science and management that
we can do. Thus, appropriate organization makes it
easier for us to acquire and apply useable knowledge
of the natural world. Similarly, well-matched rights
create circumstances in which individuals have a
self-interested incentive to act and acquire
knowledge that is consistent with the solution of our
collective problem of adaptation. Together,
organizations and rights that are well-matched to
the system are a necessary foundation, but not a
guarantee, of effective governance.
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Transaction costs and multiscale governance
Fisheries management is costly. We have to expend
resources, decide what data we need about the
environment, acquire that data, analyze it, discuss
its uses, make decisions, implement them, and most
importantly, learn from this entire process so that
we better understand the effect of our actions on the
system. The costs are usually substantial and force
us to place limits on the information and knowledge
that we can acquire and what policies we can apply
to a complex system.
The organizational principles that apply for adaptive
and efficient fisheries management, i.e., a
management process that can be improved over
time, are the same as those that apply to the
organization of any large, and almost all small,
enterprises whether they are governments,
corporations, or cooperatives. For any organization,
the greater the heterogeneity, and the more rapid the
change in its environment, the greater are its
information requirements for successful adaptation.
The costs of acquiring and using that information
are determined largely by the structure of the
organization, i.e., whether it is relatively centralized
or multiscale, i.e., decentralized, and the way that
structure is matched or mismatched with its
environment.
If we imagine we are in a stable, simple
environment, an organization designed for
centralized decision making appears eminently
rational. Managers face low transactions costs.
Because feedback is regular and contains little
noise, the knowledge they acquire accumulates, and
ages only slowly. Under these circumstances they
can, even through trial and error, figure out an
optimal collective outcome and devise rules to make
sure that that kind of outcome occurs. However, in
a complex environment, our sense of rational
decision making changes in significantly important
ways. For example, Frederick Hayek (1945) makes
the point that centralized decision makers cannot
deal with the diversity of complex economic
systems, because they know so little about local
conditions. Their ignorance is not necessarily
ignorance of scientific principles or of rigorous
analytical procedures; it is ignorance of local
conditions engendered by the high, unsupportable
costs of monitoring, analysis, decision making, and
the ability to react within a time frame appropriate
to local conditions. The problem he points to is one
that arises in complex systems in which the
particulars of time and place are important to system
outcomes. These particulars place significant limits
on decision maker’s ability to act with full
rationality and often render the results of well-
intentioned, centralized decision making ineffective,
replete with unintended and, ultimately, irrational
consequences (Scott 1998).
These same general ideas flow out of the new
institutionalist contributions to organization theory
(e.g., Arrow 1974, Williamson 1985, Simon 1996).
A corporation, or any other large organization, is
faced with significant costs associated with
acquiring knowledge of its environment and
operations. These costs force the organization to
confront two fundamental trade-offs between: (1)
centralized and multiscale control of the production
of goods and services within its own organizational
framework, and (2) production within its own
organizational framework and the purchase or
acquisition of those same goods and services on the
market or through government. Most of the
significant innovations in industrial organization
are changes that economize transactions costs and,
thereby, make new ways to organize production
feasible. An assembly line, for example, with its
continuous repetition of the same tasks using the
same materials to produce the same output is
intended to standardize activities at the local level
so that central managers can efficiently coordinate
production. However, as anyone who has ever
worked in a factory knows, even in these
deliberately simplified circumstances, the particulars
of time and place rear their ugly heads, and efficient
production requires the devolution of considerable
discretionary authority to the line foreman and even
to individual line workers.
As the local environment of an organization
becomes more diverse and changeable, the
transactions costs of centralized organization rise.
If managers attempt to maintain centralized control
under these circumstances, they find that large sets
of potential policies are infeasible, because
information acquisition and implementation are too
costly. For example, in fisheries numerical catch
controls, closed areas and gear restrictions are
policy options that are generally feasible, even if
imperfectly, at a broad scale. However, policies that
are designed to respond to timely information about
fine-scale fish movements and behavior, habitat
conditions, and other sorts of fine-scale ecological
attributes of organisms and populations, especially
those subject to rapid change, are not usually
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practical, because the transactions costs of
monitoring, analyzing, and deciding at this scale
tend to be so substantial when they are undertaken
by a centralized authority.
In fisheries, multiscale management can ameliorate
these problems, but only when the structure of the
managed system imparts some independence to
local subsystems, a property that Simon (1996) calls
near-decomposability. Near-decomposability means
that some events at the local, or subsystem, level
have impacts and feedback that are retained within
that locality (Frenken et al. 1999, Levin 1999). In
the absence of some local independence, everything
is connected to everything else and hopelessly
complex. The mental model outlined earlier argues
that the relative independence of subsystems, as
defined by the regularities of physical and
oceanographic features, provides a consistent way
of simplifying ecosystem complexity. Coves, bays,
coastal shelves, basins, and broad oceanographic
regimes collocate with days, lunar cycles, seasons,
and decadal shifts (Apollonio 2002) to create a set
of boundaries, i.e., discontinuities that partition the
complexity of the system into a nested spatial/
temporal hierarchy of almost independent
subsystems.
In principal, the number of levels in that nested
hierarchy might be extremely large, however, as a
practical management matter, its depth is a matter
of economics. The desirable extent of nesting, or
the number of levels in the hierarchy, depends upon
the trade-off between the benefits of the better
feedback that can be obtained at local levels and the
higher costs associated with the maintenance of
more boundaries. The latter can be expected to rise
exponentially with the creation of more levels,
thereby, limiting the practical amount of
organizational devolution that might work.
Nevertheless, given the generally broad scale of
current management, efforts to create incrementally
smaller-scale management units are not likely to
encounter diminishing returns.
There are a number of ways that these benefits of
devolution might be expected to appear. An
important implication of decomposability is that
every management problem in the system does not
have to be coordinated or solved simultaneously.
Thus, the transaction costs of management are
reduced when there are relatively independent
lower-level management units, corresponding with
subsystems, simply because information about
activities whose impacts are contained within any
given locality does not have to be passed up and
down the organizational hierarchy and does not
need to be the subject of explicit coordination.
Management decisions can be partitioned into an
efficient grouping of spatially nested, hierarchical
subsystems in which the scale at which feedback
occurs is mirrored as much as possible in the scale
of decision authority or, in the language of
economics, in which the costs and benefits of
decisions can be nearly internalized. These
efficiencies of multiscale organization reduce the
transactions costs of governance and make it
possible to do more for the same expenditure of
resources.
The partial isolation of local subsystems means that
natural or man-made disasters are also partially
isolated, and the tendency for local shocks to
propagate through the system is dampened. This
provides resilience to the wider system, but it also
means that the potential costs of management
experiments are greatly reduced. Near-decomposability
means that it is possible to find local ecological
circumstances that are more homogeneous, more
self-contained, more easily monitored and,
therefore, more amenable to good experimental
design than would be possible in a broadscale,
heterogeneous arrangement. Good experimental
designs are more likely to be credible to resource
users and, for that reason, more likely to be
undertaken. Looked at from another angle, in
multiscale systems with many local management
units the probability of making mistakes, as well as
the costs of those mistakes is much less than might
be expected in a centralized regime, and for this
reason experimentation is more likely to occur.
One of the most significant limits to the efficiencies
that can be obtained from multiscale organization
arises from the fact that ecological organization
rarely fits the rigid hierarchy of human
organizational charts. In this sense, ecological
systems are open and leaky, and their successful
management requires expensive communication
and coordination across organizations. In this
regard, Vincent Ostrom (1991) writes about the
tendency of relatively independent organizational
entities to create polycentric networks; that is,
networks that communicate up and down the
organizational hierarchy, as they are supposed to
according to most organizational charts, and across
scale and outside the hierarchy, in a way that does
not conform to the organizational charts. The most
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notable aspect of polycentric networks, at least from
the efficiency perspective, is the self-interested
motivation that defines their structure. Organizations
initiate communication outside the hierarchy of
which they are a part in order to protect and further
their own interests. The selectivity of these
incentives generates a self-organizing process that
restricts information flows to a subject matter and
volume that is deemed economical by the affected
organizations (Levitt and March 1988).
This is important in fisheries management because
fish and other organisms tend to cross any fixed
human boundary. For a local organization, this
openness means a loss of control. Organizations
elsewhere can affect its well being, usually
adversely through intercept fisheries, etc.
Therefore, to protect its own interests, a local
organization can be expected to identify and to
address the significant ecological events that cross
the boundaries of its jurisdiction. This is
immediately obvious at the scale of nation states,
but exactly the same organizational incentives arise
at local scales (Young 2002). Without some sort of
local control, the ruling incentives for participants
are those of roving banditry; with local organization,
on the other hand, each locality has a compelling
need to pay attention to what its neighbors are doing
to the fish. Consequently, the result of this concern
is that the flow of information in a multiscale and
cross-scale system becomes self-organizing,
efficient, and strongly oriented toward resolving the
ecological externalities that arise because of
necessarily imperfect human boundaries. Additionally,
when management communicates at several
different scales, and at many different locations at
the same scale, its ability to understand how local
phenomena affect or propagate to broader scales,
and how broader scale events impact more local
scales is greatly enhanced. As such, local
organization and polycentric networks complement
one another. They reinforce the institutional
circumstances that facilitate strong conservation
incentives, and facilitate the allocation of resources
for the acquisition of the information necessary to
act upon those incentives. Thus, the self-interest of
local organizations injects into the system a cross-
boundary, multi-scale conservation interest that is
basically absent in a centralized regime.
Enhanced governance capabilities are another
important consequence of multiscale organization.
Governance is easier, but certainly not assured of
success, among smaller groups of people who are
in reasonably frequent contact with one another
(Ostrom 1990, Acheson 2003). Repetitive
interactions, shared homogeneous circumstances,
and the communication advantages of face-to-face
contact make it possible to engage in deliberative
processes, to develop assurances about others’
intentions and, consequently, to develop rules that
might not otherwise be feasible. It may be possible
to agree to particular gear restrictions or times and
places of fishing or other circumstances of harvest
that, in an arm’s-length, impersonal, slow-moving,
centralized environment would not be enforceable
or even realistic to consider. This gives management
a much broader scope for experimentation, and is
another reason to expect a faster rate of learning,
adaptation, and presumably, better conservation.
A closely related and not often mentioned benefit
of multiscale organization is that careful
partitioning of system-wide decision making
reduces the number of people who have to be
engaged at any particular scale. This tends to create
some of the advantages of face-to-face, repetitive
contact. Multiscale and cross-scale communications
constrain internal group dynamics at all scales so
that they are less prone to the impasses and excesses
that seem to arise frequently in small groups, the
darker side of face-to-face, repetitive contact. This
occurs because the imperfect decomposability of
the system continuously exposes small groups, at
all scales, to other elements in the system. This
increases the likelihood that alternative knowledge
and/or policies will become known and, thereby,
increases the chances for continued learning and
adaptation.
In short, from a social and management perspective
the importance of the place-based, coevolved
adaptations of marine organisms and populations is
that these adaptations create a degree of local
ecosystem coherence. This makes it possible to
simplify the complexity of the ecosystem through
the place-based, multiscale organization of
management. A multiscale social/organizational
arrangement that is congruent to the natural system
in this way increases our ability to obtain feedback
from the system and reduces the transactions costs
of management. This tends to relax the constraints
on the practical application of our scientific
conceptions and, thereby, expands the set of
economically feasible management policies. This
puts us in a better position to address the many
drivers of a complex system and, most important,
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to experiment, learn, and adapt to the ocean
environment.
Appropriate Incentives
Nevertheless, these benefits of organizational
congruency are significantly limited in systems in
which fine-scale phenomena are important to
system functioning. At this scale, what counts is the
decision making of the individual, not the collective
decisions of a group. In a relatively simple system,
e.g., as in a conventional single species conception,
the fine-scale limitations on organizational
effectiveness do not appear to be significant. Rights
constructed around a single driver such as fishing
mortality can be enforced relatively easily, and their
costs would not be expected to be a significant
barrier to effective management. However, if one
adopts a view of ocean systems that places an
emphasis on multiple drivers, many operating at fine
scales, one’s view of the importance of fine-scale
adaptations is increased, as is one’s view of the costs
of not accomplishing that adaptation. With fine-
scale complexity, as organization devolves to a finer
scale, boundaries become more numerous, and the
frequency of ecological externalities, i.e., effects
that extend beyond the scope of the local decision
maker, increases. Individuals and groups are
presented with more and more opportunities for gain
at the expense of their neighbors. This raises the
costs of monitoring and enforcement and tends to
offset the benefits of better feedback. Failure to
solve this problem at local scales can lead to the loss
of local system components and accumulate to
failure of the system as a whole.
Developing appropriate incentives is not, of course,
a problem that is unique to fisheries. It is, in a sense,
a principal problem of human governance. The
question is how we might arrange our own
governance so that individuals and groups have the
liberty to use their own intelligence for their own
benefit without, at the same time, being able to pass
costs onto or acquire uncompensated benefits from
others. The solution to the problem is in the
institutions we use to govern our individual and
collective behavior (McCay and Acheson 1987,
Ostrom 1990). Institutions are the collection of
coevolved and/or designed norms, customs, rules,
and laws that give us relatively secure expectations
about one another’s behavior and, for that reason,
allow us to engage in collective action. Institutions
limit self-interested behavior, but also open the door
to new and different opportunities that otherwise
might not be present. If we create rules prohibiting
trespass, we deny ourselves the opportunity to go
onto one another’s land, e.g., for example, to gather
the fruits of natural production, but by so agreeing
we create the far more beneficial, long-term
opportunities that arise from the possibility of
cultivation that is secure from theft. Hence, when
we develop effective rules that prohibit trespass, our
self-interested incentives shift away from the
pursuit of activities that are individually beneficial,
but likely to have a collectively detrimental effect,
toward the pursuit of activities that are individually
and collectively beneficial.
The overfishing problem is the same kind of
problem. It involves the establishment of rules that
restrain individual fishing activities and, thereby,
close off many short-term opportunities. If those
restraining rules are effective they create greater,
but different, fishing opportunities that better serve
the long-term interests of both individuals and
society. For rules to be effective in a complex,
changing environment, however, it is extremely
important that the terms of individual rights are
designed in a way that is matched with the spatial
and functional dimensions of the individual
components of the natural system. Consider a
simple terrestrial example in which individual rights
holders are given exclusive access to a piece of land.
Such rights create circumstances in which the rights
holders might learn how to adjust their own behavior
in a way that enhances the natural production or,
even more, so that they might learn how to
deliberately cultivate crops or animals. The eventual
outcome will depend almost entirely upon the
knowledge of the rights holders and their ability to
use that knowledge to influence production. If the
life history and relevant ecological dependencies of
the organisms of interest to the rights holders are
nicely contained within the boundaries of their land,
their ability to capture feedback about the effects of
their actions and, consequently, to learn is greatly
enhanced. To the extent that this is not the case,
much of the potential value of their right is out of
their control, and their future is dependent to a
certain extent upon the actions of others.
In these cases and in the absence of agreements
concerning mutual action or restraint, each right
holder must take advantage of opportunities that
shift their own costs of production onto their
neighbor and/or steal the benefits of their neighbors'
efforts. For example, in many terrestrial systems,
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the tendency to create small-scale property rights
without broader scale considerations has led to
unintended, broadscale environmental problems.
Curtin (2002) cites the transformation of large areas
of grazing lands in the southwestern part of the
United States to unusable brush, because given the
limitations of their property right and desire to
maximize income, individual ranchers, or the
Bureau of Land Management acting for them,
suppressed the large-scale fires necessary for the
maintenance of a grass dominated, grazing friendly
regime. Many similar agricultural examples quickly
come to mind, e.g., the U.S. dust bowl in the 1930s,
the desertification of the Sahel, salinization of
irrigated agricultural lands, the runoff of nutrients
that leads to the eutrophication of lakes, and so on.
In almost all these cases, rights were not well-
matched with the relevant ecological scales, and this
encouraged fine-scale behavior that led to the
erosion of the system upon which the rights were
predicated. It is probably fair to assume that the
designers of the rights system did not set out to
deliberately create the circumstances that would
destroy the value of those rights. Their design was
most likely a reflection of their mental model of the
ecological system they were in. However, with
hindsight it is clear that they created rights regimes
that encouraged behavior that, over time, either
destroyed or significantly reduced the value of those
rights. Even when these effects were recognized,
the regimes were often unable to respond
effectively, because the people holding those rights
were so heavily invested in the physical and human
capital appropriate to the expectations that
accompanied those rights at the time of their
establishment and not to the newly recognized
eroded state of their system (see Diamond 2004).
Fisheries also are subject to an inseparable
connection between our mental model of the system
and the expectations people form about appropriate
investments in knowledge and capital. For example,
given the species-specific, broadscale mental model
of system function that characterizes conventional
management, a single species regime that creates
individual rights to a share in an overall quota, e.g.,
an individual transferable quota, would be expected
to generate incentives consistent with the long-term
sustainability of the resource. Scott (1993) makes
an interesting and important argument to the effect
that individual fishing rights can be expected to
promote a strong interest in the private and
collective acquisition of knowledge for maximizing
the benefits stream associated with the right. For
example, quota shares generate these kinds of
incentives. Holders of quota shares should be, and
generally are, interested in good enforcement, good
population assessments, and better understanding
the behavior of the species to which their rights are
connected. In most instances, these collective
interests are strong enough to call forth self-taxation
schemes, collaborative science efforts, and a variety
of other collective actions that are almost
completely absent in open access regimes. The short
run efficiency effects that arise in these
circumstances are clearly demonstrable.
The other side of that same coin is that any set of
rights also creates strong incentives to withhold
information or to resist the public acquisition of
certain kinds of knowledge, also for the purpose of
maximizing the benefits stream available to the
rights holder. Fishermen are not likely to reveal
where they made that big haul yesterday, that sweet
little hole where they have been bringing in a steady
catch for the last couple of weeks, the by-catch they
incur, or the habitat for some other fishery that they
happen to be destroying while making a good catch.
Open access rights might be expected to lead to a
strong disposition to oppose the development of
almost any knowledge other than what is necessary
for the immediate private exploitation of the
resource, simply because any addition to publicly
held knowledge has a strong likelihood of leading
to competitive or regulatory restrictions on the
income stream derived from that right. Similarly,
the holder of a species-specific license or a quota
share is not likely to be interested in the public
acquisition of knowledge that his or her behavior
causes damage to another fishery or to the system
as a whole and, for this reason, is likely to withhold
that kind of knowledge from the public domain and/
or oppose its public acquisition.
Oliver Williamson (1985) uses the phrase
“information impactedness” to characterize the
incentives people acquire in these situations; like a
sore tooth, information just does not want to come
out. Consequently, because fishing rights bias the
acquisition of knowledge, it is important that they
be carefully matched to the natural system so that
they encourage the private provision of the
ecological knowledge necessary for sustainability,
or in different language, so that we can avoid being
locked in to local optima that are inconsistent with
sustainability (Frenken et al. 1999). Fishermen, but
also administrative and scientific bureaucracies,
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invest heavily on the basis of the expectations
created by the rights regime in which they work and,
for that reason alone, their private, administrative,
and scientific interests are usually threatened by
change (Finlayson 1994). They become strongly
interested in the persistence of the current regime
whether it is collectively beneficial or not. For
example, a rights regime tuned to a broadscale
conception of management generally creates strong
incentives for large, mobile boats that can search
efficiently for a school or aggregation of fish and
harvest them with a minimum of cost and time.
Ownership and investment patterns, product
markets, processing, labor markets, administrative
organization, and scientific knowledge all adapt to
the geographic and technological scale of harvesting
that flows out of the interaction of individual rights,
management scale, and the attributes of the
resource. A fundamental management change that
requires, for example, rights adapted to a fine-scale
ecological approach is likely to redefine efficiency
and business success in terms of different fishing
strategies, different technology, and different
market arrangements, all of which are likely to
threaten current business and bureaucratic
strategies, investments, and skills.
For these reasons, the design of access rights that
are consistent with sustainability is critically
dependent on our mental model of ecosystem
structure and process. That model molds our
expectations about what kind of knowledge we need
for sustainability and the kind of rights regimes
appropriate to the acquisition of that knowledge.
Complexity means we will always be faced with
imperfect knowledge about the functioning of the
ecosystem and our affect upon that functioning; for
that reason the design of rights appropriate to this
kind of system must avoid, as much as possible, the
tendency toward path-dependent lock-in and must
emphasize incentives for the private and public
acquisition of broad knowledge about the system.
In this regard, it is interesting that the de facto rights
that fishermen create for themselves in near open-
access, multispecies conditions bear a closer
resemblance to intellectual property rights than they
do to the kind of agricultural land rights that are the
implicit model in most of the fishery and common
property literature (Gatewood 1984, Wilson 1990).
The reason these de facto rights are configured in
this way is due to a fisherman’s inability to produce
specific biological outcomes. As a result, what pays
off for each individual is the continuous acquisition
of information about the current configuration of
the resource. This knowledge is his greatest asset,
and it is the reason why fishermen tend to be so
secretive about where they fish.
However, good fishermen are also good
cooperators. A coordinated search process, or
simply the reciprocal exchange of information about
the results of individual search, greatly expands a
fisherman’s knowledge of current circumstances
and, at the same time, makes substantial
contributions to the historical database he carries in
his head and uses to interpret current information.
Unfortunately for fishermen, it is difficult for even
a small group to maintain sharing arrangements for
any appreciable period. This is because the
proprietary value of information about current
fishing is so high, and its exchange with, or “sale”
to other fishermen who are not part of the
arrangement, is so easy. This makes it difficult to
monitor, verify, and enforce the terms of its sharing.
Even if the terms of the arrangement are not actually
broken, fishermen’s inability to effectively monitor
one another and, because of the complexity of the
system, the necessarily ambiguous terms specifying
the sharing contract make it difficult to maintain an
atmosphere of trust. As a result, cooperative sharing
arrangements break down frequently.
In spite of this, these kinds of arrangements are
interesting because they mobilize valuable, but
select private knowledge in a way that results in a
collective benefit, i.e., within the sharing group. As
such, these arrangements provide a tentative model
for a rights system, capable of addressing the
knowledge requirements of complex fisheries. The
most problematic aspect of such a model concerns
the individual cost-benefit calculation that each
fishermen is forced to confront when deciding
whether to contribute private knowledge to the
public pool. Put simply, the problem is that any
information a fisherman contributes to the public
pool stands a good chance of being translated into
new, restrictive rules and/or might put his
competitors in a better situation and, therefore,
reduce his fishing opportunities. The only thing that
will lead to a decision to provide private knowledge
is an expectation that those possible costs will lead
to different and better fishing opportunities that are
of net benefit to him as an individual. In the instance
of coordinated or reciprocal search the payoffs from
shared information are relatively short term and
usually easy to correlate with the receipt of shared
information. The information a fisherman might
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provide for regulatory purposes, on the other hand,
will have a much longer term and much less certain
payout. To take a simple example, if a fisherman
were to report large aggregations of mixed juvenile
and adult fish, it is possible that a governing body
will choose to close fishing on that aggregation. In
the short run, a well-enforced closure will lead to a
loss of catch and income for the reporting fisherman.
However, in the long run, at least as long as it takes
the juveniles to reach harvestable size, the
fisherman, but only as a member of a group, might
possibly encounter much better fishing opportunities.
Whether his expectation of future benefit is positive
depends critically on the fisherman’s sense of the
likely biological outcome and on whether he is
likely to be in a position to capture any of the benefits
of that outcome. Both a fishermans’ expectations
about biological outcomes and about his future
share of that outcome are a function of the
governance regime.
The way in which governance affects those
expectations is the subject of a large literature on
common resources (McCay and Acheson 1987,
Pinkerton 1989, Ostrom 1990, Hanna 1997).
Among other things, that literature has come to
emphasize the importance of small groups and
communities because in these circumstances, rule
making is easier, compliance higher, and
enforcement cheaper. The “collective feedback/
complex systems” problem outlined here does not
contradict any of the lessons of that literature. In
fact, a complex environment magnifies the
importance of these governance capabilities. This
is because the cost-benefit calculus that individuals
have to consider in a complex environment is not
straightforward. The “looseness” of natural
regulatory processes in this kind of system means
that any connection between fishing restraints and
biological outcomes is likely to be ambiguous, and
the longer the term and the more species-specific
the objective of the restraint, the less certain the
outcome. As a result, the compelling causal
relationships that are often theorized as the basis for
self-interested restraint tend to be absent or at least
tenuous and always changing.
The role of governance in this kind of situation is
not simply a matter of setting and bringing about
compliance with rules that have well-known
outcomes. There is a critical prior step, i.e., the
creation of conditions that elicit the private
provision of public knowledge about the
environment and the human players in that
environment. This kind of information is necessary
for reasonable collective decisions in a complex
environment and is something that the governance
regime, especially impersonal arms-length governance,
cannot compel. Consequently, because the
individual cost of those private contributions is
always positive, what is important to the fisherman
and to the collective is not so much the police power
of the state, but the expectation that the terms under
which information is provided will lead to beneficial
results.
Conventional management does its best to ignore
the way that complexity affects rule making and
favors, instead, a mental model in which the
ecosystem and individual populations operate in
some sort of simple, clockwork mechanism with
clear, if stochastic, causality and predictability.
Rights designed using this mental model produce
behavior consistent with that perspective, but not
necessarily consistent with sustainability. Fishermen,
of course, pursue their self-interest as best they can
whatever rights they are dealt. For example, when
rights bind fishermen into species-specific fisheries,
those rights expose them to the difficulties of
forecasting, i.e., controlling outcomes at the species
level. This does not mean that they cannot develop
expectations of private gain, but it does mean that
those expectations will lead to fishing strategies and
to private investments in physical and human capital
that reflect the kinds of biological outcomes that can
be produced or forecasted given the species-specific
terms of the right. In particular, given this particular
mismatch of rights and the environment, one would
expect a rational maximizing fisherman to have a
strong preference for knowledge and activities that
emphasize relatively predictable, short-term
outcomes, e.g. maximizing his yield from a
recruited year class. These activities are not
necessarily consistent with system sustainability,
and, even with an excellent governance process,
may do nothing to prevent, and may perversely
encourage, the erosion of ecosystem structure and
function. Similarly, economizing public officials
who hold the same temporal perspective can be
expected to have strong preferences toward policies
that respond to these private incentives. The point
for economists is that the discount individuals apply
to the future value of the resource is a function of
their rights, and that single species rights create
strong biases in favor of high discount rates.
On the other hand, rights that are congruent with a
subsystem, e.g., a particular area of the ocean, will
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generate different feedback and self-interested
patterns of learning. They shift the basis for
individual expectations toward whatever natural
regularities are consistent with the functioning of
the subsystem, not only a particular species. If
fishermens’ numbers are limited, such rights give
them the flexibility to adapt to the compensating
variation among populations; this shifts their
individual forecasting horizon to a much longer
temporal scale than is likely to be the case for any
individual population. It tends to internalize
ecological connections, and for these reasons, in the
presence of good governance, such rights can be
expected to generate strong incentives for the
private acquisition and provision to the public of
knowledge about the long-term dynamics of the
entire subsystem. As noted earlier, private rights of
this sort will generate, through the political process,
strong incentives for the administrative and
scientific acquisition of complementary, system
relevant public knowledge. In effect, a system-
based rights regime can be expected to generate
strong incentives for the acquisition of both private
and public knowledge that is consistent with the
sustainability of the system and, importantly, lower
the rate at which the future is discounted. Such
rights, by themselves, are inadequate for a solution
to the problem of the ocean commons. Good
governance is still required to stitch ecologically
congruent rights and organization into a workable
collective solution.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of
feedback arising from social-ecological linkages in
complex adaptive fisheries systems. When
compared with conventional fisheries management,
this perspective leads to different interpretations of
the impact of human activity on these systems and,
therefore, to different ideas about how human social
behavior might be better matched to ecological
structure and function. In particular, from this
perspective, the management structures, and
individual fishing rights that are the intellectual
children of conventional broadscale, single-species
theories of fish populations fail to match human
activity to ecological structure and function. They
tend to encourage regulatory responses that
optimize short-term, forecastable, bioeconomic
objectives; this leads to the unintended erosion of
ecosystem structure and function and, consequently,
diminishes system sustainability.
 
1. The organization of complex ocean
ecosystems is best decomposed into, or
conceptualized as, a set of spatially nested,
nearly independent subsystems.
 
2. Our practical ability to obtain good feedback
about the behavior of ocean systems is limited
principally by the collective transaction costs
we incur acquiring knowledge about its
complexity and coordinating our approach to
its use.
 
3.  A multiscale organization, congruent with
the spatial structure of the ecosystem, reduces
the transaction costs of management and
facilitates our collective ability to experiment,
learn about, and adapt to both local and broad
circumstances in a timely and appropriate
way.
 
4. The ability to forecast future states in ocean
systems is generally a function of the
biological mass of the entity under
consideration, i.e., short for small organisms
and small populations and longer for large
organisms, large populations, and the system
itself.
 
5. Individuals’ and organizations’ self-interests
leads them to preferentially direct their
acquisition of knowledge of the natural
world, their adoption of new technology, and
their capital investments toward those
activities whose outcomes they can forecast
and, given their rights, control.
 
6. Individual rights have to be congruent with
ecological structure and function, i.e.,
system-based rather than species-based, in
order to avoid “roving bandit” incentives and
assure that individuals’ self-interested
actions are consistent with the long-term
temporal scale required for sustainability, and
 
7. The ambiguity of cause-and-effect in a
complex natural system places a high
premium on the continuous acquisition of
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system relevant information and, because of
that, on relatively personal forms of
governance that are able to generate the
assurances necessary to bring forth the private
provision of that information.
 
From a practical perspective, improved feedback
for the purpose of better science and management
will require multiscale governance that starts at a
local scale, in which the most effective boundaries
of localities are defined by the spatial organization
of the ecosystem. It will require, further, polycentric
organization that is able to establish the efficient
flows of information and countervailing interests
needed to compensate for the always-imperfect
ability to match human organization with the
complexity of ecological organization. This
organization will need to be buttressed by individual
rights to fish that are congruent with the spatial and
temporal structure of the ecosystem, i.e., area-
based, multispecies or subsystem-wide, fishing
rules and gear designed to accommodate the fine-
scale behavior of individual organisms and
populations. Finally, both organization and rights
have to be embedded within a system of relatively
personal governance that is able to develop the
assurances necessary to bring the fine-scale
knowledge of fishermen into play in the
management of the resource.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art9/responses/
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